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JPL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER DEFINITION
• THE TRANSFER OF ORGANIZED KNOWLEDGE TO A PROJECT
OR PROGRAM FOR THE EVENTUAL PURPOSE OF PRODUCING
NEW OR IMPROVED, PRODUCTS, PROCESSES OR SERVICES.
• TRANSFER WILL OCCUR THROUGH ONE, OR MORE, OF THE
FOLLOWING MODES:
• OCCASIONAL CONSULTING
• DOCUMENTATION (REPORTS, ASSESSMENTS, PROGRAMS,
OR DRAWINGS)
• TRAINING (ON-THE-JOB, ON-SITE OR ELSEWHERE)
• DEMONSTRATION (PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE OR APPLICATION
TO A REAL-WORLD PROBLEM)
• COLLABORATIVE TECHNICAL WORK.
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JPL TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
TOO OFTEN R&D HAS BEEN CONTENT TO
_rHROW ITS PRODUCT 0VER_EWA-LL AND
HOPE SOMEONE WILL CATCH IT.' T._2
"BOTH sIDEs OF THE FENCE"
;]_ c ::: ? _z .... ± 7 :- :c _: _. .
• SMALL THROUGHPUT AND VOLUME
• LOW INERTIA
. DEDICATED AI"rENTION
• JUDGEMENT CRITERIA
• EXTENSIVE REWORK PRACTICAL
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT WITH ASSISTANT
ENGINEERS
WORK PERFORMED BY SPECIALISTS AND
TECHNOLOGISTS
FLEXIBLE OPERATIONS AND INTERACTION
TIGHT CONTROL POSSIBLE
• FLEXIBLE EQUIPMENT
• LITTLE DOCUMENTATION - DATA INTENSIVE
• COST NOT PRIMARY
• CHANGES ROUTINE, EASILY IMPLEMENTED
• REAL-TIME ANALYSIS, TRACEABILITY, AND
FEEDBACK
• QA SEPARABLE FUNCTIONS
IMPLEMENTATION OR PRODUCT!OH
PRODUCT MANUFACTURING MANAGEMENT
WITH SUSTAINING ENGINEERING CORE_ _ ....
WORK DONE BY ENG_EEJ_SA-N-DTRA]NED
PERSONNEL
ORGANIZED PRODUCTION
MANUFACTUR/NG TOLERANCE NECESSARY
LARGE THROUGHPUT AND VOLUME
HIGH INERTIA
LARGE BATCH 'I_HILOSOPHY"
PASS/FAIL CRITERIA
REWORK DISRUPTIVE, UNINTERRUPTED
FLOWS, STAGING DELAYS
NARROW LATITUDE, SEVERAL SHIFT
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS SYSTEMS
EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION - DATA/
OPERATIONS INTENSIVE
COST PRIMARY
CHANGES DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT
NON-ROUTINE ANALYSIS DIFFICULT,
FEEDBACK DELAY RESULTS IN LOSSES
QA NECESSARILY INTEGRAL
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JPL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY MATURITY
MATURE
_"__EN BY COST REDUCTION
PRESSURE ON MARGINS
f BARRIERS TO CHANGE
f ADVANTAGE TO CHALLENGERS
GROWTH
L/DRIVEN BY MARKET RESEARCH
PRESSURE ON SPEED
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
ADVANTAGE TO MARKET LEADER
EMERGING TECHNO
DRIVEN BY PROBLEM RESEARCH
PRESSURE ON NARROWING OPTIONS
BARRIERS TO RISK TAKING
ADVANTAGE TO ENTREPRENEUR
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JPL SIMPLIFIED LOOK AT BOTH SIDES
ISSUE
• MANAGEMENT
• STAFFING
• THROUGHPUT
• INERTIA
• DOCUMENTATION
• COST
TECHNOLOGY OR ADVANCED
• TECHNICALLY ORIENTED
• TECHNOLOGIST AND SPECIALISTS
• SMALL
• LOW
• MINIMAL
• NOT PRIMARY
IMPLEMENTATION OR
P_B09_g_(;_J_
• PRODUCT ORIENTED
• ENGINEERS AND PRO-
DUCTION PERSONNEL
• LARGE
• HIGH
• EXTENSIVE
• PRIMARY
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JPL TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
CAPABILITY OF USER
CULTURE OF BOTH ORGANIZATION(S)ORGANZIATIONS
\ \ I /
l TECHNOLOGIES
TRANSFER
FAILURES
TRANSFER
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JPL Barriers
• The user community lacks a process to identify common technology
requirements
• The user community lacks a vehicle to exert the collective leverage to
cause JPL/NASA to implement common design.
• Resources Invested in existing systems and applications, and the
attitude and culture of the work force make It difficult to evolve to new
technologies.
• Current practices encourage a tactical approach to solving technical
problems while Ignoring key strategic (i.e. long term) issues.
• There are inadequate Incentives fostering the Insertion of new
technology in to new missions. The linkage between technology payback
and achieving missions goals Is not strong.
• Fear of being unable to complete a mission (on-time, within budget, and
meeting mission goals) using "newer technology.
• There is no documented, coherent JPL/NASA vision for broad-based
technology integration and the role of technology transfer in achieving
that vision.
THH-Sa
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JPL Barriers (cont'd)
• There is no shared vision for developing a technology transfer process.
• Transfer is further complicated by the fact that oft times capabilities
rather than specific products must be transferred.
• With today's projects, you cannot simultaneously accept a ....
"fixed-priced contract from Congress to oevelop a major unoenaKmg
and at the same time support technology development and the
unavoidable attendant risks, i.e. cost uncertainty.
• Inadequate staffing by engineering. A common response to the
suggestion for new technology is "We do not have.any.one here who has
the technical skills and knowledge to incorporate tins tecnnology tmo
current projects."
• Theperception that a technology is too complex will often lead the
Intended users to question the technology developers credibility.
• NASA does not develop serious plans beyond a five year new start
horizon
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JPL TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS
BASI..C TECHNOLOGY R_ESEAR_H..I LEVEL 1 BASIC PRINCIPLES OBSERVED AND REPORTED
I-lr-
RESEARCH TO PROVE TECHNICAL I L LEVEL 2 TECHNOLOGY CONCEPT AND/OR APPLICATIONS FORMULATED
FEASIBILITY I
| LEVEL3 ANALYTICAL & EXPERIMENTAL CRITICAL FUNCTION AND/OR
i,. CHARACTERISTIC PROOF-OF-CONCEPT
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRA'fiON
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEMS TEST AND OPERATIONS
LEVEL 4 COMPONENT AND/OR BREADBOARD VALIDATION IN LABORATORY
ENVIRONMENT
LEVEL 5 COMPONENT AND/OR BREADBOARD VALIDATION IN A RELEVENT
ENVIRONMENT (GROUND OR SPACE)
- LEVEL 6 SYSTEMtSUBSYSTEM MODEL OR PROTOTYPE DEMO IN A
SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT (GROUND OR SPACE)
LEVEL 7 SPACE PROTOTYPE DEMONSTRATION IN A SPACE ENVIRONMENT
LEVEL 8 ACTUAL SYSTEM COMPLETED AND "FLIGHT QUALIFIED" THROUGH
TEST AND DEMO (GROUND OR SPACE)
LEVEL 9 ACTUAL SYSTEM "FLIGHT PROVEN" THROUGH SUCCESSFUL
"- MISSION OPERATIONS
THH-7
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JPL SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS
(PROPOSED)
I--"
BASIC_CHNO_OG...YR_SEARCH.I LEVlEL1 NEW BASIC PRINCIPLES/SOLUTION METHODS REPORTED4
RESEARCH TO PROVE TECHNICAL I I LEVEL 2 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FORMULATED
FEASIBILITY I..FLEVEL3 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN VALIDATED ANALYTICALLY OR VIAsIMULATIONS
I L=v=,4 CRmCALFUNCTION_ALGORrmMDE ONSTRATED
I
_OLO_YDEV.ELO_PMF.NT i LEVE_ CRITICALCOM_:)NEI_IT_PRO'I'OTYP_E=_)1_ANTENvIRONMENT
PROTOTYPEENGINEERING MODEL TESTED IN OPERATIONAL
r LE'_L6 ENVIRONMENT
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRAT"_N_
FI.EV_. __7 ENGINEERING MODEL TESTED IN OPERA=TION8
S YS_TF.k_U_.BS..YS_M_.DEVELOPMEN_ I.£_LII FULLFUGHTCAPABII.BITYIlNCORPORTEDiNPRODUCT)
ONS_._LL=V_ 9 _¢TUALSYSTEM"R._m PROVEN"THROUGHSUCCiZSSFUL
MISSION OPERATIONS
#..YSTEM$ TEST AND OPERA'It
- _k
THI-I-$
JilL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MATRIX
(FROM A STUDY)
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JPL WHY? - PART OF THE ANSWER IS THE
CHICKEN/EGG SYNDROME
MUST HAVE:
• PROGRAMCREDIBILITY
• COST/SCHEDULE
PREDICTABILITY, I.E.
MATURITY
OSSA
AMBITIOUS MISSIONS
NOT CONSIDERED FOR
LACK OF ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY
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JPL WHY? - MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE PLANNING
CRITERIA ARE PART OF THE ANSWER
NEEDS
• PROGRAM
CREDIBILITY
• COST/SCHEDULE
PREDICTABILITY
- MATURITY
TECHNOLOGY, YOU
DON'T HAVE MISSIONS
THAT REQUIRE rl'l
NEEDS
TECHNOLOGY/
NOT DEVELOPMENT
JUSTIFICATION
PRIORITY
FUNDING
THIS IMPASSE MUST BE BREACHED THH-11
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Jill WHY? - DIFFERENT VIEWS OF TECHNOLOGY
"READINESS" ARE ALSO A PROBLEM
1 OSSA
)
TECHNOLOGY
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FUNDING GAP
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TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS
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JPL FUNDING PROFILE DURING
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
FUNDING LEVEL
!
i
5
,P
DEVELOPMENT
TIME
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JPL NASA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTERFACES
C ADMINISTRATOR .,)
I
t _ t
C COOE_) - , . ( CODES)
l ' l
I ' c 11.,_.. ,_ _ _ ¢.._ ASSISTANTCODERS l _; I =0_ / AA
_w
,,,=, J _!, =_ L.
._,<<>oo,,,,_,,si _=!'.i! . #
COOE. ] .o_ ,, _I f .,_,ON,
DEVE_O_ME_J":-=--_'L P.O_E_TDIVISION IMPLEMENTING(RC, RM, RP, RF, RX) DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY 1 I MISSION
DEVELOPMENT _ I _ IMPLEMENTINGCENTER
CENTER I
TECHNOLOGY _ I _ IMPLEMENTING
COMPANY/ COMPANY/
UNIVERSITY I, UNIVERSITY
{
CENTERS
INDUSTRY/ I
ACADEMIA
I THH-1S
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JI::IL KEY FACTORS
• PLANNING
USER INVOLVEMENT
• COMMUNICATIONS
• A PROCESS IS REQUIRED
• KNOWING AND ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
• RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY .....
FUNDING
JPL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
'I"HH-I§
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JPL THE DO'S
• TREAT THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS A PERSONAL COMMITMENT. IT IS PEOPLE THAT MAKE
PARTNERSHIPS WORK
• ANTICIPATE THAT IT WILL TAKE UP MANAGEMENT TIME. IF YOU CAN NOT SPEND THE TIME, DO NOT
START THE TRANSFER
• MUTUAL RESPECT AND TRUST ARE ESSENTIAL IF YOU DO NOT TRUST THE PEOPLE YOU ARE
WORKING WITH, FORGET IT
• REMEMBER THAT BOTH PARTNERS MUST GET SOMETHING OUT OF IT. MUTUAL BENEFIT IS VITAL.
THIS WILL PROBABLY MEAN THAT YOU HAVE GOT TO GIVE SOMETHING UP. RECOGNIZE THIS AT
THE OUTSET
• DO NOT PUT OFF RESOLVING UNPLEASANT OR CONTENTIOUS ISSUES UNTIL "LATER".
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JPL THE DO'S (contd)
• RECOGNIZE THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRANSFER/COLLABORATION, CIRCUMSTANCES AND
MARKETS CHANGE. RECOGNIZE YOUR PARTNER'S PROBLEMS AND BE FLEXIBLE
• MAKE SURE THAT YOU AND YOUR PARTNER HAVE MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE TRANSFER AND
rrS TIME SCALE
• GET TO KNOW YOUR OPPOSITE NUMBERS AT ALL LEVELS
• APPRECIATE THE CULTURAL DIFFERENCES. DO NOT EXPECT A PARTNER TO ACT OR RESPOND
IDENTICALLY TO YOU
• RECOGNIZE YOUR PARTNER'S INTERESTS AND INDEPENDENCE
R4-11
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JPL MEASURE YOUR BOSS'S RDQ
THE RDQ (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT QUOTIENT) WAS ORIGINALLY
DEVELOPED BY WARREN LUSHBAUGH TO EVALUATE JPL ENGINEERS,
GROUPS, SECTIONS, ALDs...
DEFINITION:
RDQ - 10 LOG (NUMBER OF "A'I-I'A BOY" RI_QUIRED TO CANCEL_
A SINGLE "OH S..." I
-10 0 10 _
SAND-BOX
PLAYERS
ACCEPTABLE
R&D
ACCEPTABLE
IMPLEMENTATION
FOSSILS! OR
RETIRED-
IN-PLACE
__ING
• THH-20
,_,-_ _ _ _ .
!
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1.0 Introduction
At its worst, traditional technology transfer is "tossing the good ideas over the wall to
engineering" (see Figure 1). The ideas are not "caught" by the people on the other side; the
results: missed opportunities; the technology developer is isolated from the intended user; the
technology developer certainly does not know where the user is going; and the intended user does
not know the new technology is coming. No wonder that these ideas are not "fielded" by the
intended user.
At its best, technology transfer is the process by wh_ both the intended user and technology
developer get what they want and need. The user receives new or needed capabilities. The
technologist receives recognition, continued funding, satisfaction or the like.
TOO OFTEN R&D liAS BEEN CONTENT TO
"TIIROW ITS PRODUCT OVER THE WALL AND
IIOPE SOMEONE WILL CATCH IT,'
Figure 1 Traditional Technology Transfer
It may be said, that the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) has a planning window of today
through 2025, or ten years beyond initial long-term presence on Mars. Critical to the success
of these long-lived programs is the ability to remain technologically viable during this extended
development and mission-operations era. When the capabilities of terrestrially deployed
systems are increasing by an order of magnitude every five to ten years, computers every three
to four years, and detectors every two years, what does it mean to design systems for programs
that require ten years to develop and have a life expectancy of up to 35 years? There are a
number of obvious options: (1) Freeze the technology and stash a lifetime of spares, (2) plan
for a complete replacement every five to seven years, (3) ignore the need for change and let the
future take care of itself, or (4) plan to evolve the system. Only the fourth option suits the
missions' purposes.
From a JPL point of view, these decadal missions map into the need to consistently and rapidly
move the results of research and development into main stream mission development. For JPL
survive and prosper, upgrading of technology must be a vital part of each mission. At present,
JPL's technology utilization spans a dizzying range from 1970's to 1990's technology. These
are all significant drivers leading to the realization that a more formal technology transfer
process is needed at JPL
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This paper will discuss the requirements for a successful technology transfer program and what
such a program would look like. In particular, this paper will address the issues associated
with technology transfer in general, and within the JPL environment specifically.
= _ ..................... _ ....... i._ -_ _" _=_ ...............
The balance of the paper is in two Sections, i.e. Background and Technology Tr_sfer. Section 2,.
Background, will (1) set the stage, (2) identify the Barriers to successful technology transfer;
and (3) suggest Actions to address the Barriers either generally or specifically. Section 3,
Technology Transfer, will present a profess with its supporting management plan that are
required to ensure a smooth transfer process.
If the reader is interested only in the process, the Background Section may be skipped ... thus,
you may proceed directly to Section 3.
2.0 Backaround
Technology transfer may be defined as
the transfer of organized knowledge to a project/program for the
eventual purpose of producing new or improved, products,
processes or services. Transfer will occur through one, or more,
of the following modes: occasional consulting, documentation
(reports, assessments, programs, or drawings), traifiing
(on-the-job, on-site or elsewhere) , demonstration
(proof-of-principle or application to a real-world problem), and
collaborative technical work.
Given this definition, it is obvious that technology transfer is absolutely dependent on person-
to-person communications and is affected by all those things which encourage or inhibit
communications, such as need, funding or confidence.
One important observation is that, in general, most "new" products are in fact improved
versions of products that were available "last" year. They are based, not on a brand new idea
from science, but on improving an existing product. And the process of repeated incremental
improvement that produces these new versions of the product is inherently resistant to ideas
from outside itself. Figure 2, details some of the Implications of Technology Maturity. Thus, it
is important to have a routine mechanism for inserting these technology improvements into the
development cycJe,: :
It does not take too many missed opportunities before both sides start losing interest in the
whole process. Missed handoffs have the potential of large impacts on the ....projects. Thus, whal
we need are clear mechanisms (viz procedures, processes) with their associated management
and cultural infrastructures, that enable reliable, consistent, and successful technology
transfers.
Embedded within this mechanism is the recognition that the attributes, needs, etc for each of the
organizations have different drivers e.g. cultural, motivation or rewards systems (see Figure
3). For example, in advanced development, documentation only need be adequate for individuals:
intimately involved in the technology, whereas, in implementation, documentation is paramount
in the organizations ability to provide reproducible, standard products.
=
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todw_e
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Grow_/
Emerging Technology
Odv_ byp_01_em_mh
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Figure 2 Implications of Technology Maturity
Advan©gd Develonment
• Technical Management with assistant engineers
• Work performed by specialists and
technologists
• Flexible operations and interaction
• Tight control possible
• Small throughput and volume
• Low inertia
• Dedicated attention
• Judgement criteria
• Extensive rework practical
• Flexible equipment
• Uttle documentation - data intensive
• Cost not primary
• Changes routine, easily implemented
• Reel-time analysis, traceability, and feedback
• QA separable functions
|mnlementatlon or Production
• Product manufacturing management with
sustaining engineering core
• Work done by engineers and trained personnel
• Organized production
• Manufacturing tolerance necessary
• Large throughput and volume
• High inertia
• Large batch "philosophy"
• Pass/Fail criteria
• Rework disruptive, uninterrupted flows,
staging delays
• Narrow latitude, several shift continuous
operations systems
Extensive documentation - data/operations
intensive
• Cost pdmary
• Changes difficult to implement
• Non-routine analysis difficult, feedback delay
results in losses
• QA necessadly integral
Figure 3 "Both sides of the fence "1
1 "Technology: Development to Production:, J. L. Abita, IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, Vol EM-32, No. 3, August 1985, pp 129-131.
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We may establish an alternative view of Figure 3 by observing the relationships as depicted in
Figure 4. This view enables a view of categories of issues as they relate to advanced
development or production.
Issue Technoloav or Advanced ImolementatJgn or
production
• Management • Technically oriented • Product oriented
• Staffing • Technologist and specialists * Engineers and production
personnel
• Throughput • Small • Large
• Inertia • Low • High
• Documentation • Minimal • Extensive
• Cost • Not primary • Primary
• Figure 4 Simplified Look at Both Sides
The technology transfer process of tomorrow (Figure 5) must provide the env[ronment_to
enable the identification of new requirements, emerging technologies with their forecasts, and
insight Into organizational capabilities. Thus, as technology items are developed, another
process (outside the normal research process) is required to assure that these items have a
reasonable chance of transfer to the end user. The environment established by the process must
support and be sensitive to all the drivers in each organization, yiz. their needs, their
technology characteristics, their production capabilities.
2.1 Technoloav Readiness Levels
NASA's standard Technology Readiness Levels are depicted in Figure 6. For technology_re!ated
Issues, levels 1 through 7 are used. The additional two levels ( 8 and 9 ) are pr_e=_nted_for
completeness, i.e. to show the full development cycle. The levels are annotated tO show t_e:
higher level relationships among the activities. In general, technology transfer occu_ _ the :
Technology Demons!rat[o_ Level, : -
These definitions of readiness levels are just one way to characterize the complex technology
development cycle. One must remember that this taxonomy is for general referent, l"heleyels
are to provide common ground or a context for the technologists and target users to establish _
mutual understandings. These levels should not be used slavishly, without thought, for t_en,
they become an additional barrier to successful technology transfer. For example, cons=_derthe
readiness levels are reflected in figure 7. "l'his characterization is attempting to better des_e
a software-intensive technology development, whereas the Standard re-adiness ievvels are more
systems and hardware oriented. Although I took the liberty to annotate the software readihe-ss
levels with the same cycle description, there do remain numerous questions as to their mapping
the same way as the standard readiness levels.
Differences in technology transfer can and do occur based on the level in the system hierarchy,
viz from components to full subsystems.
Additionally, technology at one end of the continuum may have a very narrow (or even single)
target user, whereas at the other end, the technology may have broad, generic applicability.
Programs have the option of tackling key technology earlier if the technology is mainstream to
their mission. Thus, these levels are used as guidelines in preparing for the eventual insertion
of new technology into mainstream use.
!
|
i
=
=
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Figure 5 Technology Transfer - Tomorrow 2
Technology Readiness Levels
Basic Technolo_.Research
Research to Prove Technical
FNsibff_y
Tec_ nolo_.Develop m.ent --
Techrml_v DernorlStratorl
_ SX._.enV_..Subs_rste_..mDeveio..Bment
S_'tem_ Te_t rand _neratinns
I
-- Level I Basic Pdnciples Observed and Reported
m
Level 2 Technology Concept and/or Applications Formulated
m
m
Level 3 Analytical & Expedmental Critical Function and/or
-- Charactedstic Proof-of-Concept
m
m
level 8
Level 6
Level 7
- Level 8
CIJv_i 9
Level 4 Component and.or Breadborad Validation in Laboratory
Envlmnment
Component and/or Broedboa¢l Validation in a Relevent
Environment (Ground or Space)
System/Subsystem Model or Prototype Demo In a Simulated
Environment (Ground or Space)
Space Prototypte DernonstratJonIn a Space Environment
Actual System Completed and "Flight Qualified" Through
Test and Demo (Ground or Space)
Actual System "Flight Proven" Through Successful Mission
Operations
Figure 6 Technology Readiness Levels 3
2 "Transferring New Technologies From R&D to Manufacturing," W. E. Souder and V.
Padmanabhan, Research • Technology Management, September-October 1989, pp 38-43.
3 See the Appendix for a narrative description of these levels.
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Software Technology Readiness Levels
(Proposed)
__..ddc T._echnologvResearch ! Level I New BasicPdnciples/SolutionMethodsReported
Pl--
ResearchtoProv, Techn/cal ! L, Level 2F asibility
L _ ,.v,3
Level 4
Techno_k_LDevelopment
Level
Level
Technnl_nvDenmn_tra_n m
I.=vei 7
--S_stem--.tS_u_te--mDe..e.vel°-Bme._nt-- Level II
I_vei 9
Swt_rn_ TeMand C)n_m_nn_ i
m
L -
Rgure 7 (Proposed) Software Technology Readiness Levels 4
2.2 A Model for Technoloov Transfer 5
..... : . -- _ __ -
A study at the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation(; focused on seven aspects
of technology transfer: effectiveness of technology transfer at the consortium; effectiveness of
various methods for technology transfer; Importance of various factors in facilitating the
technology transfer process; importance of barriers to technology transfer at both the
consortium and the shareholder companies; agreement onwho Should set the research agenda;
agreement on the type of research in which the consortium should_ engaged; and agreement on
ways that the consortium could improve the technology transfer pr_ces==_.
Based on this research four key variables emerged as especially critical in the technology
transfer process: communication, motivation, distance, and technological "equivocality" (see
Figure 8 Technology Transfer Matrix).
ConceptualDesignFormulated
ConceptualDesignValidatedAnaluticallyorvia Simulations
CriticalFunction/AlgorithmDemonstrated
5 CdticalComponentPrototypeTested in RelevantEnvironment
S PrototypeEng/nesdngModelTestedin Operational
Environment
EngineeringModelTestedinOperations
FullRightCapabig:Ity(Incorportedin Product)
ActualSystem"FlightProven"ThroughSuccessfulMission
Operations
In Figure 8, each of the quadrants is discussed in the following:
4 "Technology readiness levels for Software', Robert C. Tausworthe, JPL IOM dated March 7,
1990.
5 "Accelerating Technology Transfer in R&D Consortia', R. W. Smilor and D. V. Givson,
Research • Technology Management, January-February 1991, pp 44-49.
6 A major, for-profit, U.S R&D consortium that was established in 1983.
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Communication - Both passive and active communications are involved in
communications between technology developers and technology users. Passive
communications have a broad sweep and are usually media-based. Here, greater care
may be taken in packaging and producing a quality message.
Active links are direct, person-to-person interactions. They may range from
teleconferoncas to ad hoc teams and onsite demonstrations. The benefits of active
links center on the fact that they encourage interpersonal communications in terms of
fast focused feedback, i.e. the researcher learns from the potential user and vice
versa.
The fewer and more passive the links, the less likely the chance that technology will
be successfully transferred. The higher or more active the communication links, the
more likely the chance of technology transfer.
At JPL, communication is particularly important in that as large projects change
their mission design or switch to an entirely different mission, the technology
developers will be left with unnecessary or unneeded technology developments. This
Just leads to the need for dear, continuous communication. From this, it is also true
that all this requires robustness to accommodate (or survive) change.
Equivocality _whklh
o
:E
Black
Hole
Dead in
the Water
Grand
Siam
Long
Shot
high
low v
ComrnunicatJon
@
_3
Figure 8 Technology Transfer Matrix
Distance - The second variable - distance - involves both geographical and cultural
proximity or separation. Essentially, the result here is that the manager should
endeavor to "co-locate" technology developers and their customers via promoting
more active and direct communications links. (See Appendix A for additional
Information)
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"Equivocality -7 - This refers to the level of concreteness of the technology. Technology
that is low in equivocality is faidy easy to understand, demonstrable and
unambiguous. There is only one meaning to every individual involved in the
technology transfer- the technology is understandable and its application clear. Of
course, the higher the equivocality of the technology, the more difficult it is to educate
the prospective users on the value or application of that technology. Clearly, this is
part of the problem associated with communication.
Motivation - This involves incentives for and recognition of technology transfer.
Motivation varies by importance of the technology transfer in the culture of an
organization, the cdteda by which the individual is evaluated, and the rewards
established for those who engage in technology transfer activity.
Mot_ation means there is a definite answer to the question "What is In it for me?"
when asked by the technology users and developers.
One can tell from the selection of the abscissa and ordinate axes labels that Motivation and
Communication are the dominate factors in a successful technology transfer. As indicated above,
perceptions of the maturity of the technology are directly related to the abiiity of the
participants to communicate.
In the final analysis of this model, it would seem, at least from a JPIJNASA point of view, that
one significant missing factor is cost or affordability. Fiscal considerations play a key role in
both technology development and acceptance.
Technology transfer is "Dead in the Water" when there is low communication, low motivation,
high distance, and high equivocality. The participants do not talk with each other because there
are neither the incentives nor recognitions for those involved, because they are separated
geographically, and because the technology is ambiguous and the application is uncertainl
What we want at JPL is the "Grand Slam." To achieve this we need high communication, high
motivation, low distance, and low equivocality. In other words, because of highly interactive
communication processes, because of a variety of incentives and recognition, and because the
technology is unambiguous and its applications understood, successful technology transfer
occurs. Of course, given JPL's relationship to NASA, all this must occur at NASA HQ also.
Many of the barriers result from the fact that at any given time, no one is really focusing on
what the next-step-after-this-version would be, that is to say: researchers are doing far-out
exploratory work; a portion of development is producing the new systems required by the
current missions; the balance of development is readying the next version for a continuing
mission.
_E
!
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"Additionally, our factories and other workplaces have long been designed around management
principles that prevent organizational flexibility and change. Harvard's Michael Porter
describes it well: 'Change is an unnatural act, particularly in successful companies; powerful
forces are at work to avoid and defeat it. Past approaches become institutionalized in standard
operating procedures and management controls. Training emphasizes the one correct way to do
anything; the construction of specialized, dedicated facilities solidifies past practice into
7 Equivocality is defined to be - of doubtful advantage, or subject to interpretation.
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expensivebrick and mortar...' Suchsystemswere simplynot designedto react quickly,if at
all, to rapidly changing conditions. "8
Many would say that a fundamental problem in technology transfer is the lack of a way to bridge
the technology transfer gap (Figure 9).
/
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Figure 9 Technology Transfer Funding Gap
This gap is caused by two factors
(I) Histodcally, research is complete when a breadboard article has been validated.
This validation, which occurs somewhere In readiness level 4, usually signals the
termination of research funding (such as Code R).
(2) Unless the technology is fundamentally enabling to an endeavor, the flight project or
consumer is usually hesitant to Incorporate a new technology without the existence of
an engineedng model, at the very least. Additional confidence is built with the
demonstration of the engineedng model in an environment similar to the intended
usage. Thus, users support (such as Code S) generally is not available until the
technology reaches readiness level 6.
These two factors cleady indicate that each organization needs to recognize that
co-accountability is the only way to affect the smooth insertion of this new technology in to
mainstream usage. The Technology Transfer Plan is a vehicle to formalize this
co-accountability and its eventual transfer to the using organization. In particular, the funding
profile to bridge this gap is important (see Figure 10). The plan will document the transition
funding profile required for successful handoff. Some of the issues facing technology transfer
are beyond the scope of a single center. There needs to be a more complete technology transfer
process that includes all the NASA centers and Codes S and R within NASA itself. Figure 11,
NASA Technology Transfer Interfaces, depicts the needed interactions at various levels, i.e.
starting with industry and academia through the Associate and Administrator level of NASA.
Without explicit support within Code S for technology development/transfer activities, it will
be difficult to insert new technology into on-going or new programs. This Code S funding
8 "Technology Development in the 1990s: Will Government Polices Help or Hinder?', Speech
by Robert M. White, Under Secretary for Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, to Council
on Superconductivity for American Competitiveness, September 14, 1990.
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coupled with "good faith" support from the target user and Code R support, will provide the
basis for successful technology transfers.
Funding I._el
Figure 11 NASA Technology Transfer Interfaces 9
9 Adapted from drawings and ideas of W. J. Weber III at NASAJJPL.
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Yearly exchanges between each column (as illustrated by the horizontal doubled-ended lines)
would enhance the ability to identify needs (e.g. Code S) and emerging technologies (e.g. Code R).
As part of this exchange, more cohesive programs of technology development and transfer could
be established.
The significant barriers having differing effects are the variables of communication, motivation
or advocacy, risk or maturity of the technology, and organizational structure (distance).
Figure 12 lists some of the specific barriers identified at JPL and suggests dominate areas of
effect.
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Barrier Comm
The user community lacks a process to identify common X
technology requirements i
The user community lacks a vehicle to exert the collective X
leverage to cause JPL/NASA to Implement common design.
Advoc
X X
X
Risk
Resources invested in existing systems and applications, and
the attitude and culture of the work force make it difficult
to evolve to new technolocjies.
Current practices encourage a tactical approach to solving
technical problems while ignodng key strategic (i.e. long
term) issues.
There are inadequate incentives fostering the insertion of new X
technology in to new missions. The linkage between
technology payback and achieving missions goals is not
strong].
Fear of being unable to complete a mission (on-time, within
budget, and meeting mission goals) using "newer"
technology.
There is no documented, coherent JPL/NASA vision for
broad-based technology integration and the role of
technoloqy transfer in achieving that vision.
There is no shared vision for developing a technology transfer X
process.
Transfer is further complicated by the fact that oft times
capabilities rather than specific products must be
transferred.
With today's projects, you cannot simultaneously accept a
"fixed-priced" contract from Congress to develop a major
undertaking and at the same time support technology
development and the unavoidable attendant risks, i.e. cost
uncerta, inty.
Inadequate staffing by engineering. A common response to the
suggestion for new technology is "We do not have anyone
here who has the technical skills and knowledge to
incorporate this teChnolo,qyinto current proiects. •
The pemeption that a technology is too complex will often X
lead the intended users to question the technology
¢leveiopers credibiiity_
NASA does not develop serious plans beyond a five year new
start horizon
X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X X
X X
II,
X X
X X
X X
Figure 12 Barriers
2.4 Case Studles At JPL
Understanding the current state-of-practice for technology transition at JPL is important. It is
important to understand the attributes of recent efforts at JPL regardless of their success or
not. These interviews included both specific insertion efforts and knowledgeable peoples'
general understanding and views on technology transfer. The specific efforts at JPL included:
- Viterbi decoder for Voyager and Galileo
- Solid state power components e.g. switches, microprocessors
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- Fiber Optic Rotation Sensor (FORS)
- Onboard processing for CRAF/CASSINI
- Rhenium engine, electric propulsion
Optical communications.
These were selected because they are recent and there exists an adequate body of current
knowledge in order to extract some similarities, pdnciples or guidelines.
Without identifying the specific task or individual here are some of their insights (these are
broadly grouped via
- Cannot underestimate the value of the advocates/champions. This should be done even
to the extent of transferring someone with the technology.
- With advanced technology funding support via Code S, FPO, OSSI, etc, the
first-use-of-technology-eats-the-cost syndrome may be broken .......
- User involvement is key to the successful transfer of the technology. This enables a
"buy-in" by everyone.
- Technologist do not understand the paradigm for technology transfer. User confidence
is everything. Technologist should consider all potential end-users as from Missouri,
i.e. "Show Mel'.
Focus
- Some efforts have not been successful because the technologist became enamored with
technology as an end result in itself, thereby losing sight of the needs of the project.
They focused on the wrong problem from a flight project point of view.
- JPL has made the mistake of putting the technical person in-charge, where a task
manager is really needed. The technical support is required. One choice is to possibly
placed the technologist on staff as the chief scientist, chief engineer, etc.
- When discussing technology transfer, we really need to understand the drivers. Is the
project in dire need (technology pull)? Is the technology ripe and there are clear
applications (technology push)? Is it basic, enable technology, thereby causing the
user to take the technology earlier than normal (pre-engineedng model
development)?
- The flight projects have to very conservative because of risk. Users are generally
unwilling to accept risk in the bus; there is after all only one bus and if it fails, the
entire mission fails. Thus, the users are interested in new bus technology only if:
(1) it is mission enabling, i.e. the mission can not be accomplished without this
technology; and/or (2) it is reasonably mature, having reached the engineering model
stage and thus represents no more than moderate risk.
- Flight project should not be involved in technology development.
- Technical dsks in the instruments are often acceptable: a given mission generally
involves a range of task performed by multiple instruments, so a failure of any one
instrument does not result in failure of the mission as a whole.
- Even if a reasonably mature new technology and an interested user find one another, a
final hurdle remains: the cost of full and final flight development of the technology
must almost invariably be borne by the first user. The fact that such funding must be
provided during the trying early years of a flight program makes this last hurdle
much more difficult.
Options for making the process a smooth one:
- Technology does not come in spurts like spacecraft do. We need a continuous program
(here you may read "real budget') to develop the underlying technology for later
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Insertion. (Comments h'ke this lead to the question of "Why do not OSS! and FPO
establish technology programs like TDAs?').
- A significant portion of the Advanced Technology Development funding from Code S goes
into advanced mission planning; more should go in to technology planning and
technology Insertion support (bridging funding)._ .... _ ................
- With advanced technology funding support via Code S, FPO, OSSI, etc, the
first-use-of-technology-eats-the-cost syndrome may be broken.
- When considedng technology transfer, industry's role should be considered,
particularly since we do not usually build production units. Can synergistic
relationships be established with institutions such as Draper Labs?
- If a new technology is to be attractive and ready for use on a given mission, its
development process must usually start well before the mission itself emerges from
the pre-project phase. Unfortunately, this implies a chicken-and-egg problem: the
prospective user in not interested in Immature technology, but without user interest,
it is very difficult to advance a technology to an attractive level of maturity.
There is a broad spectrum of actions that may be taken to address the barders to technology
transfer. These include:
Involvement:
- Assign top level champions (bilateral championship). They will be the advocates of
the technology to the two organizations, i.e_ the technology developers and users. They
will draft and get concurrence on the Technology Transfer Plan.
- Involve the end user in the early stages of technology development. This involvement
may range from publication distribution and review participation, to engineering
involvement in design. This is necessary if the technologists want the potentja]_ users
to ultimately accept the technology rather than disregard it as yetanother example of
"a solution looking for a problem." _ _ _ ........ _ _ _ _ ...... _ _
- Encourage the users to participate in developing the technology. Too often technology
develope_ have been content to "throw their product over the wall and hope someone
will catch it (Figure _).'_ _ _i_ ...... _ _ _!.... - ......... _ _=
- Demonstrate the technology to the end user community. Provide opportunities for
users to mee t collectively and share their experiences, requirements and needs.
Focus ...............
- Apply the technology to a few representative problems before attempting to transfer
it 10. Thus, the recommendation is to (1) whet the user's appetite by trying the
technology on one of his applications by the technology developer in the laboratory,
then showing him how successful it was, (2) invite the user to work on the second
application, and (3) finally, initiate the transfer process, by letting the user choose
the next application and start providing the development pull and fiscal support. It is
here that one may want to consider temporarily transferring a technology developer
to the project development team.
Options for making the process a smooth one:
- Provide training by the technology developers. Often the technology developers lose
interest after the readiness stage; they do not want to write the user's manual or to
|
=
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10 Be willing to provide resources (people, time and money) to sell the technology.
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think about features that may make it easier to use. Effective transfer requires these
activities. Some accommodation must be formally made to effect this. Also, assisted
by the technology developers, the consuming organizations need to provide formal
training to the development engineers.
- Dedicate an engineer to monitor the transfer.
- Follow-up to determine the effectiveness of the transfer process. Never say "Good
bye" - feedback is important to the technology developers to fix immediate problems
as well as considering improvements for the next round in the technology. The
transfer process, itself, also needs calibration to enable improvement in the next
round of technology transfer activities.
- Identify a J[lg_Ll_g.},_1. Given the "fixed-priced" mode of flight projects, what could
help would be an arrangement whereby one or two targeted technology development
activities would be taken on by a project with the up-front understanding that these
areas would be excluded from the requirements of the "fixed-priced" constraints.
Thus, a host project would be identified. This project would be the end-user for the
technology in question.
The shotgun approach of overwhelming the barriers with actions/promoters can usually be
replaced with a more efficient approach of eliminating barriers by matching 1hem with specific
actions. These actions will be codified via the Technology Transfer Process and its associated
Technology Transfer Plans.
3.0 Technoloav Transfer
At this point, it is important to restate the definition of technology transfer:
the transfer of organized knowledge to a project/program for the
eventual purpose of producing new or Improved, products,
processes or services. Transfer will occur through one, or more,
of the following modes: occasional consulting, documentation
(reports, assessments, programs, or drawings), training
(on-the-job, on-site or elsewhere) , demonstration
(proof-of-principle or application to a real-world problem), and
collaborative technical work.
Thus, again, given this definition and what has been dismissed previously, it is obvious that
technology transfer is absolutely dependent on person-to-person communications and is affected
by all those things which encourage or inhibit communications, such as need, funding or
confldance. This communications must be between technology developers and the intended
users, where users include not just the programmatic element, but the intended everyday
utilizers of this technology. For without the ultimate end-users participation, the technology
may be transferred, but not used (i.e. the transfer use not really consummatedl).
We must overcome the general barders associated with communications, motivation, technology
readiness, and organization structure as described Sections 2.2. and the specific impediments as
discussed in Section 2.3. Some of the significant factors concerning technology transfer from
both the giving and the receiving perspectives include:
(1) Each transfer is really unique in the full sense of the word. The planning must
address the ripeness of the technology (such as the needs of the receiving community
or user; the complexity of the technology, that is to say is it a chip set or complete
subsystem; and the maturity and skills of both organizations). Thus, application
is one key to a successful technology transfer.
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(2) User _ is the next significant factor. Without the active sponsorship and
support of the "host project', it is probably a case of "a solution looking for a
problem."
(3) Since there are at least two organizations Involved in the process, continuing, clear
communication is essential. Open, working, active lines of communications are
important to the continued ability to work out process and technical issues before they
become too large to handle. Thus, communications is another key factor to a
successful technology transfer.
(4) A _ that encourages asking the right questions at the right time is next in our
list of key factors. There are appropriate questions to be addressed at each stage
(pre-transfer, planning, readiness review, and active transfer) of the transfer
process. Often the process is complicated by not asking the appropriate questions.
(5) There is a real need to address the right questions at each step of the process.
Knowin0 the auestions and their logical location in the process is also key to the
process.
(6) Often a transfer is attempted as a part-time activity or without clear lines of
accountability. The results are slow or no decisions, lack of follow through which
leads to frustration and ultimate failure. Clear lines of responsibility and
tl_are the next keys to a successful technology transfer.
(7) Technology transfer becomes a ._. Funding is identified to bridge the
gap between technology availability/demonstration and incorporation into a host
project. With identified funding sources, technology comes of age in its own right.
As discussed above, technologies are "ready-for-transfer" at different stages in their
development depending on the user's requirements state-of-the art, etc_ Thus, the process and
documentation described in this section are only guidelines, and the realityis--that each
technology effort must be reviewed on its own merits. The appropriate level of technology
readiness for transfer In any one case will depend on the needs and plans of the user organization
to become involved in the development program and effect the technology transition into
program and project activities.
3.1 The Proo-ess
The process should enable a "Grand Slam" (see Figure 8 and Section 2.2) and as such should
provide for communications paths, motivation, and shortened communications distances.
Planning is the key to a successful technology transfer. Today, even if the technology developer
and the intended user agree that the transfer is advantageous to each side, the lack of clear
planning and understanding of the questions to be addressed, leads to, at the very least, a
difficult time, and often to failure.
The Technology Transfer Process is depicted in Rgure 13. This process addresses all the key
factors described in the previous section:
- Planning
|
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- User involvement
Communications
- A processis required
- Knowingand asking the right questions
Responsibility and accountability and
Funding.
Each annual cycle starts with a review of Inputs:
(1) the current program (on-going programs with their Technology Transfer Plan, and
the current mission set),
(2) new requirements (input is based on future missions),
(3) new technologies (inputs consists of JPL thrusts, technology forecasts, and
technology needs based on the future missions), and
(4) new out-year plan and schedule (inputs are all of the above).
The results of this review may be any of the following (based on the inputs)
• termination of an on-going program (destination the "86"-trash can).
• modification of an on-going program in the light of new missions, new requirements,
and/or new technologies.
• standard continuation of current effort (probably with minor updates to the
Technology Plan).
• initiation of a new technology transfer effort.
• end user acceptance of the techno!ogyl
A standard output each year is the forecast of upcoming technology transfer candidates on the 5
to 7 year horizon. This output provides a context and some continuity to the whole transfer as a
set of activities.
The identification of a new candidate initiates a technology transfer cycle. After selection of
accountable advocates (champions) two activities are started: writing the Technology Transfer
Plan and preparation of a Technology Readiness Review. Besides the questions listed in Figures
14 and 15, the Technology Readiness Review will address issues such as:
• Basic concepts and technology associated with the transfer
• Mission requirements with derived requirements for this transfer
• State-of-practice contrasted with the state-of-art.
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• Acceptanceand successcriteria for the receiver(host project).
• State of the technology development including proof-of-concept demonstrations, etc.
• Risk and affordability with respect to current technology and the needs of the intended
users.
• Does the technology meet the needs of the intended receiver?. What is paramount -
performance? lifetime? reliability? mailability? ..other "-ilities'?
• Summary of accomplishments, identified issues and potential risks.
New
Requirements
AnnuaJ AnnuaJ
Preliminary
Selecl Fli.Ki.em Program
New Ixogmrn Advocates Review Review
End-user Acc_p_nce
Figure 13 Technology Transfer Process
The result of the Readiness Review should be permission to proceed. It is here that any special__
consideration should be documented, i.e. the need to proceed while keeping a backup position in a
viable state. Readiness does not just refer to the technology but also the the intended user. That
is to say that the needs of the ultimate user and the technology match or that they will actually
use the technologyl
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What impact can this technology offer our program/project?
What are the costs/risks associated with introducing this technology?
Where does this technology rank in Importance to our program/project needs?
Is there a plan to receive the technology in a timely fashion?
Are there adequate resources to receive and develop the technology?
What will be done to upgrade the staff, ff that is necessary?
Is there a champion/advocate for this technology? Is that parson at the right level?
Have we done an adequate job of sharing the program/project opportunities with the research
organization?
Does the giver have an understanding of the timing of our needs?
Have we agreed on what constitute a demonstration of technical feasibility?
What has been the history of the relationships between these two organizations? If there is a
history, what are the strengths upon which to capitalize?
Figure 14 Checklist for the Receivers t I
- What does the technology promise?
- How do the promises related to the program/project needs?
- What axe the costs/risks associated with developing the technology?
- How is Industry using this technology?
- Is the technology familiar/unfamiliar to the receiver?
- Where does this technology rank in Importance to the receiver?
- Is there adequate technical expertise to pick up the research?
- If not, is there any training or recruiting support we can provide?
- Is management in the projectJpmgram committed to the technology?
- Have we adequately marketed the technology?
- Do the reseamhers have a comprehensive unden=tanding of the program/project's needs and
opportunities?
- Are them adequate resources to mseamh? To transfer the technology?
- What documentation does the receiver need? Has it be produced?
- Is there a plan to deliver the technology ksa timely fashion?
- What is the proper hand-off of this technology?
- Have responsibilities been mutually delineated and accepted?
- Has the Information exchange been thorough and timely?
Figure 15 Checklist for the Givers 12
11 "A Study of the Factors Which Affect Technology Transfer in a Multilocation Multibusiness
Unit Corporation', M. L. OunJlan and E. B. Came, IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, Vol EM-34, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 194-201.
12 Ibid.
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With the goals defined, the technology transfer advocates derive a detailed plan from a general
ordered outline. This Technology Transfer Plan (see Figure 16 for the outline) is a management
artifact. Its purpose is to establish ownership of the transfer of technology between peer
organizations, i.e. a peer-to-peer process. This plan will also serve as a driver, check list, and
guide, especially since each task description explicitly relates schedule and responsible person.
In essence, this plan documents the effort, discipline, rigor, and order that are necessary to
make it all come together.
The authors of the plan are the two advocates. Approval includes: advocates, program office(s),
developing.organization(s). ....
4.0 Summary
The...................problems as_lated with technologY transferare complex, Sorne 0fthe. ][3D0;sfor a
successful collaboration and hence a successful technology transfer include:
• Treat the technology transfer as a personal commitment. It is people that make
partnerships work.
• Anticipate that it will take up management time. If you can not spend the time, do not
start the transfer. - .................... ._
• Mutual respect and trust are essential. If you do not trust the people you are working
with, forget it.
• Remember thai both partners must get something out of ii. Mutual benefit is vital.
This will probably mean that you have got to give something up. Recognize this at the
outset. L
• r: .....
• Do not put off resolving unpleasant or contentious issues until _'Iater'. _
• Recognize that during the course of the transfer/collaboration, circumstances and
markets change. Recognize your partner's problems and be flexible.
• Make sure that you and your partner have mutual expectations of the transfer and its
time scale.
• Get to know your opposite numbers at all levels.
• Appreciate the cultural differences. Do not expect a partner to act or respond
identically to you.
• Recognize your partner's interests and independence.
Each technology transfer is unique, and as such, requires careful planning. At the least, this
planning must detail (1) the technology to be transferred, (2) the readiness of this technology,
13 "The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances', K. Ohmae, Harvard Business Review, vol 67, No. 2
(March/April), pp. 143-154.
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(3) the needs of the Intended users, (4) the process and schedule for the transfer, and (5) the
acceptance criteria of the user (i.e. how do we know when the process has been successful?).
The basic dimensions of motivation - the organizations and individual, communications between
the technology developers and intended users, organizational complexities, and maturity of
technology, itself, provide a rich base of solutions. These dimensions lead to essential factors
requiring attention are planning, user involvement, communications, a process, knowing and
asking the appropriate questions, assigning responsibility and accountability and finally,
recognition that little is accomplished without adequate funding.
The detailed solutions just compliment the key factors (listed above). These factors are
embodied in the steps of the process that is described in Section 3.1.
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1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.0
3.0
3.1
3.2
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
5.0
6.0
AppendixA
AppendixB
AppendixC
Appendix D
Introduction
Identification
Overview
Document Scope
Controlling Documents
Applicable Documents
Organization and
Responsibilities
Polices and Constraints
Project Polices
Project Standards
Technical Approach
Work Inputs
Technical Constraints
Deliverables
Project name
Bdef description of the Project. Brief
statement of what this Technology does.
What this document addresses and how it
relates to other documents
Documents that control this document
Documents referenced by this document ........
The TTP shall provide definition of roles and
responsibilities of personnel and their
relationships. Show the project
organization chart. Show an activity or
product-oriented work breakdown
structures with a mapping to the
organization chart.
Polices to be applied to this work
Identify JPL and other standards that are to
be used. Describe the milestone reviews.
Specify the convening authority for each
review.
Describe all inputs from other
organizational elements. Identify source,
need date, acceptance criteria.
Definition and scope of the work to be
accomplished. Identify products to be
delivered.
Methods, tools, and training
Metrics Reporting
Glossary
Acronyms
Budget
Schedules
Identify the management methods to be
applied for resource monitoring and
control, configuration management, and
product assurance. Include regularly
scheduled developme_tstatjs reviews.
Specify data to be reported to monitor work
accomplished, resources consumed,
products generated, and problems
encountered for each phase of
development.
Figure 16 Transfer Plan Outline
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AnnmxcUc 
Probability of Communication In Oraanlzation-
In Managing the Flow of Technology there were three charts depicting the Probabilities of
communication belween people under differir_ circumstances. These are reproduced here.
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Technoloav Readiness Levels Descriptions
Level 1 Basic Principles Observed and Reported - Preliminary efforts are expended to identify
the new technology and its applicability, and to provide a mathematical, empirical, or
other supportive, basis to believe in the successful creation of the technology.
Level 2 Technology Concept and/or Application Formulated - Based upon preliminary work, the
concept for the technology is evolved to specification of components, limits, and
capabilities.
Level 3 Analytical and Experimental Critical Function and/or Characteristic Proof-of-Concept
- The elements which make up the technology are constructed. In a plecewise fashion,
each required function is created and tested.
Level 4 Component and/or Breadboard Validation in Laboratory Environment - Each element is
integrated into a demonstration of the technology y. While limited in scope, application
or performance, the breadboard serves to prove the feasibility of pursuing the
development. The breadboard also helps to identify limitations, errors in components
and, perhaps, flaws in the basic theory or empirical studies.
Level 5 Component and/or Breadboard Validation in a Relevant Environment (Ground or Space )
- Following successful breadboarding, a prototype for the the technology is constructed
and tested in the working environment. This level serves to affirm that the basic
theories and motivations for the technology are correct.
Level 6 System/Subsystem Model or Prototype Demo in a Simulated Environment (Ground or
Space ) - Sometimes the prototype is transitioned into a ground qualified application of
the technology. Tested in an operational environment, the proof-of-concept model is
used to assure that no major technological flaws exist which might limit or jeopardize
the operational use of the technology.
Level 7 System Prototype Demonstration in a Space Environment - When appropriate, the
ground qualified unit is test during spaceflight. This is the ultimate check that the
technology and its embodiment are correct for the intended function in the spacecraft
application.
Level 8 Actual System Completed and "Flight Qualified" Through Test and Demon (Ground or
Space) - Given correct operation during qualification, the embodiment of the technology
is placed into operational status. Operational status primarily assures future users that
there is little or nor manageable risk in applying the new technology and that the cost of
implementation and operation/maintenance is reasonably understood.
Level 9 Actual System "Flight Proven" Through Successful Mission Operations - Common
usage.
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